

Analytic Philosophy and Avicenna

This work engages in a constructive, yet subtle, dialogue with the nuanced accounts of sensory intentionality and empirical knowledge offered by the Islamic philosopher Avicenna.

This discourse has two main objectives: (1) providing an interpretation of Avicenna's epistemology that avoids reading him as a precursor to British empiricists or as a full-fledged emanatist and (2) bringing light to the importance of Avicenna's account of experience to relevant contemporary Anglo-American discussions in epistemology and metaphysics. These two objectives are interconnected. Anglo-American philosophy provides the framework for a novel reading of Avicenna on knowledge and reality, and the latter, in turn, contributes to adjusting some aspects of the former.

Advancing the Avicennian perspective on contemporary analytic discourse, this volume is a key resource for researchers and students interested in comparative and analytic epistemology and metaphysics as well as Islamic philosophy.

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Knowing the Unknown

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Dedicated with gratitude to my parents, Alemeh and Hossein



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Contents

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	viii
Introduction: Avicenna and the Sellarsian account of experience	1
1 Sellars on the empirical grounds of knowledge	9
2 Sellars on the pseudo-intentionality of the senses	23
3 Perennial philosophy: against scientism and reason-nature dualism	36
4 Avicenna on knowing the unknown: Meno's paradox and the sensory foundations of knowledge	52
5 The mind's involvement in sense perception: Avicenna on sensory intentionality and the unity of being	82
Conclusion: On Avicenna and the so-called common medieval view	110
<i>Index</i>	117

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Introduction

Avicenna and the Sellarsian account of experience

The lingua franca of philosophy

Great thinkers as historically diverse as Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Hegel have engaged questions concerning the content of empirical beliefs and how they are justified. With the advent of analytic philosophy, the same historically puzzling questions concerning intentionality and knowledge were approached from new perspectives. This book, while taking into consideration the innovative insights of contemporary analytic philosophy, engages in a constructive, yet subtle, dialogue with Abū ‘Alī Ḥusayn ibn Sīnā’s (hereafter Avicenna, d. 1037)¹ to illuminate the affinities between his refined accounts of empirical knowledge and sensory intentionality, and those espoused by major twentieth century analytic philosophers such as Wilfrid Sellars and his successors, especially John McDowell.

While analytic philosophers are notorious for their ahistorical approach to philosophy, Sellars and McDowell place great value on engaging the history of philosophy. For example, Sellars states boldly that “[t]he history of philosophy is the *lingua franca* which makes communication between philosophers, at least of different points of view, possible. Philosophy without the history of philosophy, if not empty or blind, is at least dumb.”² I agree that engaging the history of philosophy enhances the caliber of philosophical reflection by facilitating the overcoming of narrow-mindedness, parochialism and prejudice. Accordingly, I extend the Sellarsian analysis to the work of Avicenna, arguably the leading figure in the Islamic philosophical tradition. The result is a novel interpretation of Avicenna that differs from the ways most of his contemporary commentators read him. In the mainstream scholarship, Avicenna is interpreted as either an emanatist, for whom knowledge is a matter of inspiration by a divine intellect, or as a proto-Lockean empiricist. Armed with Sellarsian arguments, I propose that Avicenna’s texts contain a more nuanced position than either emanatism or classical empiricism. Furthermore, Avicenna’s philosophy provides considerations that help in addressing some of the problematic aspects of the Sellarsian position.

Between emanatism and mythological empiricism

Modern scholars of Avicenna take conflicting stances toward his account of the significance of sensory experience for empirical knowledge. Herbert Davidson, for example, emphasizes the continuity between cosmology and epistemology in Avicenna’s philosophy. He argues that the separate and superior Active Intellect is a *tertium* between the human mind and world,

informing both the world and the intellect. Human sensory experience, on this emanatist view, is mere preparation for the mind's reception of the intelligible forms, and knowledge is only a dispensation of the Active Intellect.³ Fazlur Rahman also affirms the continuity between cosmology and epistemology and insists that Avicenna's account of the abstraction and cogitation of the sensory forms is only "*a façon de parler*" for emanation of intelligibles from the Active Intellect.⁴ Other more contemporary scholars embracing the emanatist reading of Avicenna include Deborah Black and Richard Taylor.⁵

Dimitri Gutas, on the other end of the exegetical spectrum, defends an empiricist reading of Avicenna and maintains that, for Avicenna, knowledge is accomplished within the limits of human intellect without aid from an external source. On this reading, Gutas emphasizes what the emanatists call "preparatory processes," involving the perceptive faculties of the animal soul. For Gutas, these processes are not preparatory in the emanatist sense but in the abstractive sense and result in knowledge. He writes, "[w]hat has to be kept in mind is that for Avicenna the concept of the emanation of the intelligibles from the active intellect has its place in his cosmology and it serves to solve essentially an *ontological* problem, not an epistemological one, which is the *location* of the intelligibles."⁶ Gutas thinks that Avicenna's references to the involvement of the Active Intellect in the process of knowing serve to allow for an ontological solution to the problem of intellectual memory. For if the forms were stored in the human intellect, then the human mind would constantly think them, and that is impossible.

I also defend an empiricist reading of Avicenna, but my reading diverges from Gutas's, who interprets Avicenna as a proto-Lockean empiricist.⁷ My position shares Gutas's recoil from an emanatism that interprets our consideration of sensory experience as not knowledge but a mere preparation for it. I, however, submit that for Avicenna emanatism and empiricism are not entirely incompatible. To put it more precisely, emanation is already involved in sensory experience vis-à-vis the illuminations of the external Active Intellect which informs our sensory experience *and* provides a depository for acquired intelligible forms. My point that intellectual emanation is involved in sensory experience is not just exegetical; rather, a rigorous account of such involvement, I propose, is also philosophically attractive. To that end, I urge that we learn from Sellars and his successors and allow for non-mythological, non-inferential knowledge of matter of fact. Sellars regards sensory experience as the seamless product of the cooperation of sensory receptivity and rational activity. His arguments and the contributions of his successors constitute a cutting-edge discourse in contemporary philosophy, and I draw on them to inform a more sophisticated interpretation of Avicenna's epistemology. More specifically, in this book I shall show that an appeal to Sellarsianism brings to focus the significance of the epistemological concerns illustrated in Plato's famous Meno's paradox and that the resolution of the paradox is enhanced by the work of Aristotle and then Avicenna. Avicenna's contributions to that discussion (which have been for the most part inconspicuous in the contemporary readings of his work) are essential for gaining a better understanding of his epistemology and the related aspects of his metaphysics. They also help us recognize some of the limitations of the Sellarsian project.

Avicenna from a Sellarsian point of view

In *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, Sellars debunks the epistemological category of the “Myth of the Given,” a classification that includes various versions of the empiricist thesis that all knowledge is grounded in a form of non-inferential knowledge of matter of fact. This non-inferential knowledge, according to the Myth, grounds other claims to knowledge but itself is not justified. Sellars denies that the non-inferential knowledge of matter of fact is unjustified, because knowledge would then be grounded in something that has no rational credentials (i.e., is self-authenticating). Instead, he derives the rational authority of non-inferential factual knowledge from our initiation into the linguistic space of reasons, enabling us to apply concepts appropriately.

In the section on demonstrative proof (*al-Burhān*) of his encyclopedic masterpiece, the *Book of Healing* (*Kitāb al-shifāʾ*), Avicenna refuses to base empirical knowledge on induction from contingent empirical representations. Rather, for him, like Sellars, knowledge benefits from a necessity not available in the probabilistic inductive inference from sensory data. But Avicenna argues that sensory experience is already infused with necessary rational concepts. Therefore, non-inferential knowledge of matter of fact is indeed established by the answerability of our knowledge claims to (mind-involving) sensory experience. This would be acceptable to Sellars, but despite the evidence in support of such a form of empiricism in his work, Sellars believes that our sensory experiences deliver an imperfect image of the world while the natural sciences represent the world with increasing accuracy. Sellars thus puts the completed scientific world-picture at the end of scientific inquiry; meanwhile all we have are incomplete representations that make progress in their accurate imaging of the real stuff of the world. This is not so for Avicenna, for whom sensory experience is not thus destitute.

Peter King, in “Medieval Intentionality and Pseudo-intentionality,” defends the medieval view that sensory experience has access to the world by suggesting that Sellars’s position is handicapped by a mind-body dualism.⁸ King maintains that medieval philosophers rejected such dualisms; hence they thought that sense is as intentional a cognitive faculty as intellect.⁹ King does not develop his diagnosis of the Sellarsian dualism much further than a brief reference to the latter’s account of sense impressions. In this work, however, I explore the precise nature of Sellars’s dualism. I submit that Sellars, despite his valiant efforts to resist the unwarranted encroachment of natural sciences on epistemology, succumbs to the metaphysical view that natural science is the measure of all things (i.e., a version of *scientia mensura*).¹⁰ As a result, he rejects the so-called perennial philosophy, “which is the ‘ideal type’ around which philosophies in what might be called, in a suitably broad sense, the Platonic tradition cluster.”¹¹ The basic principle of perennialism, according to Sellars, is the commitment to the reality of the manifest image “to which science brings a needle-point of detail and an elaborate technique of map-reading.”¹² Sellars, however, argues that even though “the manifest framework of everyday life is adequate for the everyday purposes of life [including *knowing*],¹³ it is ultimately inadequate and should not be accepted as an account of what there is, all things considered.”¹⁴ This dualism regarding the manifest image and the scientific image obstructs from Sellars’s view the possibility that sensory experience can have genuine access to the world.

I conclude that Avicenna's position, when read with Sellars's epistemological insights, has the advantage of immunity from the scientistic distortion that affects Sellars's metaphysics. The successes of the natural sciences transfix Sellars and some of his fellow analytic philosophers, but Avicenna's view aligns with the therapeutic view advanced by McDowell. The latter would allow us to free ourselves from the attractions of *scientism* and its forms of naturalism. The therapeutic view is not an attack on the natural sciences, as they are the gems of our intellectual disciplines. The problem is rather the unwarranted philosophical encroachment of natural science enthusiasts on epistemology and metaphysics. Avicenna's text equips us with an antidote to resist the toxic philosophical conclusions of those enchanted by scientific inquiry. It does this by demonstrating that the perennialist commitment to the existence of ordinary objects is capable of getting the world right without needing to import metaphysical relief from the natural sciences.

The plan of the work

In the first chapter, I examine Sellars's famous attack on the Myth of the Given as it concerns the foundations of knowledge as well as Sellars's own efforts to account for those infrastructures. For Sellars, as we have already seen, the epistemological Given encompasses various empiricist views according to which knowledge is grounded in non-inferential knowledge of matter of fact.¹⁵ The non-inferential knowledge, according to the Myth, grounds other empirical claims to knowledge but itself is not justified by other knowledge. Sellars denies, however, that the non-inferential knowledge of matter of fact is unjustified, because that would ground knowledge of the world in something that has no rational credentials and enters our reasoning from the outside. He argues that the appeal to the unjustified justifier is on par with what G. E. Moore called "the naturalistic fallacy" in ethics,¹⁶ insisting that "in characterizing an episode or a state as that of *knowing*, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says."¹⁷ The self-authenticating justifier is problematic precisely because it acquires its status by means of an empirical description, not a justification. By contrast, Sellars derives the rational authority of non-inferential factual knowledge from our initiation into the linguistic space of reasons, enabling us to apply relevant concepts appropriately. According to him, the proper application of a concept in a non-inferential claim to perceptual knowledge presupposes the ability to apply a whole battery of other concepts¹⁸ – including ones pertaining to other perceptible characteristics, more general (inclusive) concepts and incompatible concepts. Sellars, then, turns to Immanuel Kant to distinguish conceptualized experience from the pre-conceptual sensory encounter with the world. The latter sensing is apparently unconscious and "guides" the former. The conceptual sensory experience grounds our empirical beliefs non-inferentially, while the pre-conceptual experience explains the conceptualized experience (but does not ground it). I shall explicate and criticize this alleged Kantian distinction and its importance for Sellars's epistemology and metaphysics in Chapter 1.

In his influential *Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint*, Franz Brentano maintains that every mental phenomenon is characterized by intentionality, that is, by the inclusion of an object within itself.¹⁹ In “Being and Being Known,” Sellars argues that the senses have only a “pseudo-intentionality, which is easily mistaken for the genuine intentionality of the cognitive order.”²⁰ In Chapter 2, I analyze Sellars’s account of the pseudo-intentionality of sense impressions and their relation to the cognitive order. Sellars advocates a so-called psychological nominalism,²¹ the thesis that the intentionality of mental states (i.e., the aboutness of thoughts) is derived from the meaningfulness of overt linguistic utterances. This thesis implies a naturalistic account of the emergence of the intentionality of mental states from the proprieties that are features of overt linguistic utterances. In addition, it presupposes a natural conformism, which is “not mere imitateness (monkey see, monkey do), but also censoriousness, that is, a tendency to see that one’s neighbors do, and to suppress variation.”²² Such conformism produces patterns of propriety (normativity), which legitimate the proper use of linguistic expressions. Sellars then distinguishes the intentionality of mental representations from their capacity to get things right, that is, to picture the world. We picture the world more accurately as we advance in the natural sciences. For Sellars, as I have mentioned earlier, our sensory experience delivers an imperfect image of the world while the natural sciences represent the world with increasing accuracy. This conforms to Sellars’s aforementioned division in sensory experience, according to which scientific progress shapes our non-conceptual sense impressions, which in turn guide our conceptualized perceptions. Conceptualized perceptions, however, project a perfect image of the world only at the end of scientific inquiry; meanwhile all we have are incomplete pictures that progressively increase in their accurate imaging of the real furniture of the world.

In Chapter 3, I return to Sellars’s scientism and defend a version of the view that he characterizes as *philosophia perennis*, according to which the manifest image is real and the scientific research helps to refine our understanding of what is already manifest. I show how some of the main strands of contemporary analytic metaphysics, including Sellars’s own view, are led astray by their authors’ enthusiasm for the successes of the natural sciences. I submit that a perennialist position, in line with McDowell’s reform of Sellars’s metaphysical excesses, empowers us to resist the philosophically distorting impacts of the triumphs of scientific inquiry. McDowell restricts the clarity brought about by modern scientific revolution to the realm of law and not to the world manifested through our conceptual resources. Of course, we cannot deny that research in natural sciences provides resources for a more nuanced understanding of the manifest world and enhances our interactions with it. There are also dangers in the application of scientific research to technological manipulations and exploitations of our world. In the remaining chapters, I formulate and defend a perennialist reading of Avicenna.

In Chapter 4, I argue that in his *Book of Healing* (*Kitāb al-shifā’*), especially its *Book of Demonstration* (*Kitāb al-burhān*) in tandem with its *De Anima* (*Kitāb al-nafs*), Avicenna makes the same point as Sellars about the implicit naturalistic fallacy in the appeals to the Myth of the Given. In Avicenna’s version, empirical knowledge is not grounded in the merely contingent deliverances of animal sensory powers. Rather, he maintains, like Sellars, that knowledge

benefits from a logical necessity of which animal “cognitive” powers are bereft.²³ Avicenna also argues that the *non-inferential* knowledge of matter of fact is established by the answerability of our knowledge claims to non-propositional but conceptual sensory experience.²⁴ For this point, he draws on Aristotle’s modification of the Platonic reply to Meno’s dilemma. Knowing the unknown cannot happen miraculously; it presupposes a sensory fore-knowledge. In Chapter 4, I develop this aspect of Avicenna’s epistemology and show how his view is formed in alliance with the insights of his predecessors, Aristotle and Abū Naṣr Muḥammad al-Fārābī (hereafter Alfarabi).

For Avicenna, as for Sellars, the *non-inferential* knowledge of matter of fact is established by the answerability of our knowledge claims to sensory experience. Sellars, however, argues that sensory experience is *non-relationally* intentional because it derives its aboutness from the proprieties of the space of reasons. Avicenna is not in complete agreement, and – together with his commitment to the intellect’s involvement in sensory perception – he assigns a *relational* intentionality to the senses. Working out this contrast requires engaging in a deeper discussion of the intentionality (i.e., the object-directedness) of mental phenomena.

In Chapter 5, I begin with Brentano’s thesis, from his *habilitationsschrift* titled *Psychology of Aristotle*, that Avicenna loses Aristotle’s insight that the soul does not think without an image, or to put it as Brentano does: for Avicenna, “the sensory ceases to be the source of intellectual cognition.”²⁵ Relating Brentano’s historical and psychological theses to each other, we can interpret Avicenna to hold the view that the sensory lacks the intentionality of cognitive faculties, and this is especially mysterious in light of Avicenna’s commitment to the grounding of our knowledge in the senses, as emphasized in Chapter 4.

In Chapter 5, however, I challenge the readings of Avicenna that interpret him as denying cognitive intentionality to the senses. Of course, Avicenna and Sellars reject a reductionist account of the mental and endorse the *sui generis* status assigned to the space of reasons (for Sellars) and intellectual cognition (for Avicenna). However, I show that Sellars, in ascribing a non-relational intentionality to the sensory, limits metaphysics by the scientistic thesis that the scientific framework is more “subtle and sophisticated” than that of common-sense experience. For Avicenna, on the other hand, the world is descriptively accessible from within the space of reasons. And this counteracts the Sellarsian commitment to the indispensability of the metaphysical conjectures inspired by modern natural sciences. Relying on the *Metaphysics* and the *De Anima* of *The Healing*, I contend that in contrast to Sellars’s characterization of it, the Avicennian space of reasons (i.e., the intentional cognitive order) reaches all the way out to sensory contact. To put it more precisely, the categorial unity making up the space of reasons is drawn upon involuntarily in our sensory experience of the world.²⁶ This interpretation respects a greater number of nuances of Avicenna’s philosophy of mind and his complex view of experience. I also support the position advanced by this line of interpretation through McDowell’s refinements to Sellars’s metaphysics. I conclude that Avicenna, in turn, contributes to McDowell’s refined stance by developing an account of the *categorial unity* of the space of reasons through engaging and modifying Aristotle’s substance ontology. This is a central dimension of the discussion in Chapter 5.

In the concluding chapter, I shall consider a critique of Avicenna's position from within the perennialist view that I insist he shares with McDowell. A contemporary perennialist may contend that Avicenna's appeal to separately existing intelligences betrays his commitment to medieval religious assumptions. I reject this criticism and advance further arguments for the thesis that the appeal to Avicennian philosophy helps in crafting a response to some of the concerns within the contemporary versions of perennialism.

Notes

- 1 Throughout the book, I follow the transliteration guidelines of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (IJMES).
- 2 Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), 1. It should also be noted that a phase of McDowell's pre-Sellarsian philosophical activity did center on ancient philosophy. Furthermore, in his later work, McDowell's main historical interlocutors are Kant and Hegel. This is manifest throughout his writings, especially in his pivotal book, *Mind and World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
- 3 Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 93–94. Tommaso Alpina maintains that Davidson inherits this view from Étienne Gilson ("Intellectual Knowledge, Active Intellect and Intellectual Memory in Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Nafs* and Its Aristotelian Background," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 25 (2014): 136–37). I agree, but in *Reason Unbound* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2011), §4.2, I argue that such a reading has been in circulation at least as early as Thomas Aquinas.
- 4 Rahman, *Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy and Orthodoxy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958), 15.
- 5 Black, "Avicenna on the Ontological and Epistemic Status of Fictional Beings," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 8 (1997): 445. Taylor, "Al-Fārābī and Avicenna: Two Recent Contributions," *MESA Bulletin* 39 (2005): 182.
- 6 Gutas, "The Empiricism of Avicenna," *Oriens* 40 (2012): 411.
- 7 Ibid., 392, 423–24.
- 8 King, "Medieval Intentionality and Pseudo-Intentionality," *Questio* 10 (2010): 33.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Robert Brandom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 83.
- 11 Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," in *Science, Perception, and Reality* (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1963), 8.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 Ibid., 27–28.
- 14 Ibid.
- 15 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 15.
- 16 Ibid., 19.
- 17 Ibid., 76.
- 18 Ibid., 44.
- 19 Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, ed. and trans. L. McAlister (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1995), 88–89.
- 20 Sellars, "Being and Being Known," in *Science, Perception, and Reality* (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1963), 46.
- 21 "[A]ll awareness . . . is a linguistic affair," Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 63.

- 22 Haugeland, "Intentionality All-Stars," *Philosophical Perspectives* 4 (1990): 404.
- 23 Avicenna, *Avicenna's De Anima*, ed. Fazlur Rahman (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), §§1.5 and 5.5.
- 24 Avicenna, *Al-Shifā': Al-Burhān (The Healing: Demonstration)*, ed. A. Afifi and I. Madkour (Cairo: Organisation generale egyptienne, 1956), §1.6.
- 25 Brentano, "Nous Poietikos: A Survey of Earlier Interpretations," in *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amelia Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 316.
- 26 Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of the Healing (Kitāb al-shifā': Al-Ilāhīyāt)*, trans. Michael Marmura (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), §§1.5–6, 5.1–2.

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References

- 1 This chapter is a substantial modification in form and content of material I originally wrote for Chapter 1 of my dissertation, “Experience Conceptualized: Between the Myth of the Given and Coherentism” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 1999).
- 2 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Robert Brandom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 14. Hubert Dreyfus maintains that Sellars coins “Myth of the Given” in response to C.I. Lewis’s Kantian obsession with the “Given” element in experience in his *Mind and World Order*. “Back in 1950, while a physics major at Harvard, I wandered into C.I. Lewis’s epistemology course. There, Lewis was confidently expounding the need for an indubitable Given to ground knowledge, and he was explaining where that ground was to be found. I was so impressed that I immediately switched majors from ungrounded physics to grounded philosophy. For a decade after that, I hung around Harvard writing my dissertation on ostensible objects – the last vestige of the indubitable Given. During that time, no one at Harvard seemed to have noticed that Wilfrid Sellars had denounced the Myth of the Given, and that he and his colleagues were hard at work, not on a rock solid foundation for knowledge, but on articulating the conceptual structure of our grasp of reality,” in “Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise,” *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 79, 2 (2005): 47.
- 3 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 14. My italics.
- 4 Ibid., 15.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Ibid., 68–69.
- 7 Ibid., 73, 77.
- 8 Ibid., 76.
- 9 Ibid., 44.
- 10 Ibid., 16.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Ibid., 19.
- 13 Ibid.
- 14 Brandom’s diagram on the foundational status of sensings of sense contents is helpful:

1st Stage: Physical Object → Sensing of Sense Contents
2nd Stage: Sensing of Sense Contents → Non-inferential Beliefs
3rd Stage: Non-inferential Beliefs → Inferential Beliefs

See Brandom’s Study Guide, *ibid.*, 126.
- 15 Ibid., 19. G.E. Moore, in *Principia Ethica*, attacks naturalistic accounts of “good,” which identify some naturalistic property or state *P* as the meaning of “good.” Moore’s argument concentrates on the following question: Is *P* really good? Moore claims that the question is intelligible, and therefore *P* could not be the meaning of “good” (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988), 5–21.
- 16 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 76.
- 17 See Russell’s “On Denoting,” in *Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901–1950*, ed. R.C. Marsh (London: Allen & Unwin, 1956), 41–42.
- 18 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 18.
- 19 Ibid., 19.
- 20 Ibid., 18–19.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Ibid., 23.

- 23 Ibid., 24.
- 24 Ibid., 25.
- 25 Ibid., 24–25.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Ibid., 43.
- 28 Ibid., 44, 75.
- 29 Ibid., 40.
- 30 Ibid., 44.
- 31 Ibid., 21.
- 32 Ibid.
- 33 Ibid., 130.
- 34 Ibid., 136–41.
- 35 Ibid., 140.
- 36 Brandom, *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, & Discursive Commitment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 89.
- 37 As it will become clear in the next chapter, I agree with McDowell’s account of sensory experience. For McDowell’s reading of Sellars in this way, see his “Why Is Sellars’s Essay Called ‘*Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*’?” in *Having the World in View* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
- 38 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 40.
- 39 Ibid., 41.
- 40 In his work, Brandom accounts for the representational dimension of observation reports through the interplay between the reporter and an interlocutor. Brandom accounts for getting things right in our non-inferential perceptual judgments by invoking the endorsement of the interlocutor/score-keeper and their undertaking of the commitment ascribed to the reporter. See, for example, his discussion in “Knowledge and the Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons,” *Philosophy & Phenomenological Research* 55, 4 (1995): 903. Brandom’s *social* practice view, however, overlooks a sensible way of explicating non-inferential perceptual judgments as justified by the *experience* of the world. In my view, Brandom is not faithful to the phenomenology of the expert’s coping with her perceptual situation, as it (i.e., the coping) involves getting things right through textured responses to varying circumstances in the world (via our experience of them).
- 41 Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), 7.
- 42 In *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, Sellars states that the traditional empiricist theories of Locke, Hume and Berkeley also incorporate a version of the Myth of the Given. The latter theories, in contrast to sense-datum empiricism, consider the Given to be the results of the exercise of our unacquired (innate) ability to be *aware* of determinate sense repeatables (62). The sensation of white, for example, is an instance of our innate ability to be aware of the determinate sense repeatables. According to Sellars, all three traditional empiricists share the presupposition about our unacquired innate abilities, which is a form of appeal to the Given. They differ from the sense-datum invocation of the Given in that the latter take epistemic facts to be given, whereas traditional empiricists take non-epistemic facts as the Givens of empirical knowledge. Moreover, Sellars goes on to make it clear that despite the traditional empiricists’ shared commitment to the givenness of sensations as non-epistemic facts, these empiricists differ in how they explain our awareness of *determinable repeatables*, the genera (abstract ideas) pertaining to specific sense qualities or the determinate sense repeatables, *ibid.*, 60–61.
- 43 Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics*, 5.
- 44 Ibid.

- 45 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), A50=B74.
- 46 Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics*, 4.
- 47 Ibid.
- 48 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A78=B103.
- 49 Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics*, 4, 11.
- 50 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A20=B34.
- 51 Ibid., A86=B108.
- 52 Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics*, 7.
- 53 Ibid., 17.
- 54 Ibid., 30.
- 55 Ibid., 17.
- 56 Ibid., 12.
- 57 Ibid.
- 58 Ibid., 9.
- 59 Ibid., 30.
- 60 Ibid.
- 61 O'Shea, "Introduction: Origin and Legacy of a Synoptic Vision," in *Sellars and His Legacy*, ed. James R. O'Shea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 2.
- 62 Ibid.
- 63 Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics*, 7.
- 64 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 83.
- 65 Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics*, 7.
 - 1 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Robert Brandom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 83.
 - 2 Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, ed. and trans. L. McAlister (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1995), 88.
 - 3 Ibid., 89.
 - 4 I have isolated these with the help of three sources: (1) the article by Pierre Jacob, titled "Intentionality," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Fall 2008. URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/intentionality>; (2) Deborah Black, "Intentionality in Medieval Arabic Philosophy," *Quaestio* 10 (2010): 65–81; and (3) John Haugeland, "Intentionality All-Stars," *Philosophical Perspectives* 4 (1990): 383–427.
 - 5 Haugeland, "Intentionality All-Stars," 384.
 - 6 Ibid., 386.
 - 7 "[A]ll awareness . . . is a linguistic affair," in Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 63.
 - 8 Haugeland, "Intentionality All-Stars," 404.
 - 9 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 92.
 - 10 Ibid., 98–102.
 - 11 Ibid., 103.
 - 12 Sellars, "Being and Being Known," in *Science, Perception, and Reality* (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. 1963), 49–50, 57–58.
 - 13 Ibid., 45–46.
 - 14 Ibid., 56–57. In "Sellars's Thomism." McDowell is critical of Sellars's account of the intentionality of the deliverances of sense. He maintains that the senses do belong in the intentional order and Sellars's reading of Aquinas is in the grip of a problematic view that separates the intentional mind and the non-intentional nature and places sensory impressions in the latter (*Having the World in*

View (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 239–255). I shall develop this view in my criticism of Sellars on sensory intentionality.

- 15 Ibid., 58.
- 16 Haugeland, “Intentionality All-Stars,” 406.
- 17 Ibid.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Ibid., 407.
- 20 The remainder of this chapter is a substantial modification (in form and content) of material. I originally wrote for the Chapters 1 and 3 of my dissertation, “Experience Conceptualized: Between the Myth of the Given and Coherentism” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 1999).
- 21 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 100.
- 22 Sellars ascribes such positing to our “fictional” Rylean ancestor, Jones (ibid., 102).
- 23 Ibid., 99.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Ibid., 100.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Ibid.
- 28 Ibid., 83.
- 29 Ibid., 84.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Ibid., 81–82.
- 32 Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), 101.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 90–98 (especially 92 and 98).
- 35 Ibid., 102.
- 36 Ibid., 107.
- 37 Ibid., 81.
- 38 Sellars, “Being and Being Known,” 56.
- 39 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 116.
- 40 Ibid.
- 41 Ibid., 116–17.
- 42 See also my discussion of the concern with total insight in Chapter 1, in the section titled “Kant on conceptual empirical content.”
- 43 McDowell, in the first of his Woodbridge Lectures: “Sellars on Perceptual Experience,” emphasizes the metaphysical nature of Sellars’s appeal to the common descriptive content by classifying it as a form of transcendental philosophy, which is done “at a standpoint external to that of the conceptual goings-on whose objective purport is to be vindicated – a standpoint at which one could contemplate the relation between those conceptual goings-on and their subject matter from sideways on,” *Having the World in View* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 17. McDowell thinks that this is not the only take on transcendental philosophy that is possible, ibid., 18. For an alternative transcendentalism that is favorable to McDowell’s own view, see Chapter 5, section titled “Avicenna’s transcendentalism: on essence and existence.”
- 44 Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” in *Science, Perception, and Reality* (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1963), 27–28.
- 45 Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics*, 17.
- 46 Ibid., 9.
- 47 Ibid., 17.
- 48 Ibid.

- 49 Ibid.
- 50 Ibid., 16.
- 51 Ibid., 18.
- 52 Ibid., 29.
- 53 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 82. Sellars's scientism is also characterized by his famous slogan: "science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not," *ibid.*, 83.
- 54 Sellars, "Phenomenalism," in *Science, Perception, and Reality* (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1963), 97.
- 55 Ibid.
- 56 I shall discuss the objection from sensory illusions later in Chapter 5, in the section titled "Conceptual sensory content."
- 57 McDowell, "Intentionality as a Relation," in *Having the World in View* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 61.
- 58 "In experience one takes in, for instance sees, *that things are thus and so*. That is the sort of thing one can also, for instance, judge." McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 9.
- 59 McDowell, "Avoiding the Myth of the Given," in *Having the World in View* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 258–9.
- 60 Ibid., 262.
- 61 Ibid.
- 62 See also Sellars's earlier "Some Remarks on Perceptual Consciousness," in *Crosscurrents in Phenomenology*, ed. R. Bruzina and Bruce Wilshire (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), 169–85.
- 63 McDowell acknowledges this in "A Sellarsian Blind Spot," in *Sellars and His Legacy*, ed. James R. O'Shea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 101.
- 64 McDowell, "What Myth?" *Inquiry* 50 (2007): 348.
- 65 Ibid.
- 66 Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics*, 17.
- 67 According to McDowell, Sellars replaces that idea with transcendental conditions ("Sellars on Perceptual Consciousness," in *Having the World in View* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 16). McDowell also hints that Sellars's non-conceptual sense impressions account for the richness of grain in sensory consciousness.
- 1 Originally, I engaged the material in this chapter in Chapters 2 and 3 of my doctoral dissertation, "Experience Conceptualized: Between the Myth of the Given and Coherentism" (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 1999). The text of the dissertation has been modified substantially in form and content.
- 2 Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," in *Science, Perception, and Reality* (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1963), 8, 19.
- 3 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Robert Brandom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 82.
- 4 Sellars, "Phenomenalism," in *Science, Perception, and Reality* (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1963), 97.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968), 50.
- 7 For a discussion of problematic aspects of Kant's subjective idealism, refer to Chapter 5, the section titled "Conceptual sensory content."
- 8 Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," 8.
- 9 Ibid., 18.

- 10 Rorty, "Representation, Social Practise, and Truth," in *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 160.
- 11 Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 204.
- 12 Ibid., 151–52.
- 13 Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics*, 82.
- 14 Ibid., 101.
- 15 Ibid., 16.
- 16 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 82.
- 17 Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics*, 140.
- 18 Rorty, "Representation, Social Practise, and Truth," 154.
- 19 Quine, *Word and Object* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960), 161.
- 20 Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 200.
- 21 Ibid., 198.
- 22 Quine, "Ontological Relativity," in *Ontological Relativity & Other Essays* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 35.
- 23 Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 198.
- 24 Quine, *Word and Object*, 221.
- 25 Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 194. Rorty has in mind Quine's attack on the first dogma of empiricism, which amounts to an attack on the analytical given. The attack on the first dogma concerns a "fundamental cleavage" between the analytic (statements true because of meaning alone) and the synthetic (statements whose truth is dependent both on meaning and on the world), "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in *From a Logical Point of View* (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), 20. Quine rejects this dogma by (1) locating "analytic" in a circle of mutually inter-definable terms including also "synonymy" and "necessarily" (something whose presence in the language would make interchangeability *salva veritate* in all contexts a sufficient condition for synonymy), (2) trying, to no avail, to come up with an acceptable account of one of those terms, and (3) concluding from this failure that there is no fundamental cleavage between analytic and synthetic statements. This conclusion is important because it denies a privileged epistemological status to analytic statements: They belong with synthetic statements in the space of reasons. It is not unimportant to point out that despite its significance for the attack on the Given, Quine's conclusion is ambiguous: On the one hand, it can be understood as a stronger thesis that we have no understanding of an idea of analyticity. This rendition of the conclusion is challenged by Putnam in "The Analytic and the Synthetic." According to Putnam, the emphasis, in the rejection of the fundamental cleavage between analytic and synthetic, should be on "fundamental." Putnam argues that it is not really Quine's point (even though he talks at times as if it is) to reject the circle of terms in premise 2, but rather to deny that they have a significance that is *fundamental* in the way presupposed by the appeal to analytic truths as given. Such an appeal would construe analytic truths as acquired independently of other claims to knowledge, and necessary for justifying them. Putnam maintains that of course there are analytic truths (e.g., "All bachelors are unmarried," "All vixens are female foxes"), but that the possibility of singling them out as analytic is uninteresting, "The Analytic and the Synthetic," in *Mind, Language, & Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 36. An excursion into the niceties of Putnam's argument is beyond the scope of this discussion. It is adequate to realize that Putnam's rendition makes Quine's conclusion less strong and therefore more plausible, but maybe less Quinian.
- 26 Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in *Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 189.
- 27 Ibid., 198.

- 28 I should mention that the *reductio* of the thesis that there is only one conceptual scheme is not stated explicitly by Davidson. I have constructed it from Davidson's claim that "if we cannot intelligibly say that schemes are different, neither can we intelligibly say that they are one," *ibid.*
- 29 *Ibid.*, 196.
- 30 *Ibid.*
- 31 *Ibid.*
- 32 King, "Medieval Intentionality and Pseudo-Intentionality," *Questio* 10 (2010): 33.
- 33 Davidson, "Mental Events," in *Essays on Actions and Events* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 208.
- 34 *Ibid.*
- 35 *Ibid.*, 209.
- 36 *Ibid.*, 208.
- 37 *Ibid.*, 225.
- 38 Simon Evnine, in *Donald Davidson*, offers the following useful example and clarification: Davidson "holds that each individual, token mental event is also a physical event. But to say of some particular mental event, such as my present belief that I am thirsty, that it is a physical event, a certain state of my brain, carries no implications about whether other mental events of the same type, i.e., other people's beliefs that they are thirsty, or my belief on a different occasion, will be identical to physical events of the same type. Your present belief that you are thirsty may be an entirely different kind of physical event from the physical event to which my belief that I am thirsty is identical" (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 61.
- 39 Davidson, "Mental Events," 225.
- 40 Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, 204.
- 41 *Ibid.*, 204–5.
- 42 Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth," in *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 139.
- 43 *Ibid.*, 141.
- 44 *Ibid.*
- 45 *Ibid.*, 139. Rorty's account is aligned with James O'Shea's clarification of Sellars's view as a naturalism with a normative turn. O'Shea maintains that the space of reasons is logically irreducible but causally reducible to the physical processes; see, for example, his *Wilfrid Sellars: Naturalism with a Normative Turn* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 177. As we have seen, Rorty admits this but criticizes Sellars's scientism and the claim that the ideal extensional scientific discourse adjusts the representational quality of the space of reasons. O'Shea's reading of Sellars is also sensitive to his scientism; see Chapter 6, "Truth, Picturing and Ultimate Ontology," of *Naturalism with a Normative Turn* (especially 162).
- 46 Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth," 159.
- 47 *Ibid.* Contrast Rorty's anti-representationalism with Brandom's attempt to salvage representational truth through the social interplay between the reporter and an interlocutor; see Chapter 8 of *Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, & Discursive Commitment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), especially 495–96. Brandom accounts for getting things right in our non-inferential perceptual judgments by invoking the endorsement of the interlocutor/scorekeeper and her undertaking of the commitment ascribed to the reporter. See *Making It Explicit*, 594–600. See also "A Social Route from Reasoning to Representing," in *Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 157–83. For Rorty's skeptical reply to Brandom's resuscitation of representationalism within a social pragmatic framework, see "Robert Brandom on Social Practices and Representations," in *Truth and Progress* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 130–34.

- 48 Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," 198.
- 49 Rorty, "Representation, Social Practise, and Truth," 160.
- 50 Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," 8–19.
- 51 Sellars faults perennialism for not being able to reconcile the ordinary (person-centered) and the scientific notions of causality (*ibid.*, 18–19). Rorty's position exemplifies this apparent inability and the reach of the resulting dualism.
- 52 McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 153.
- 53 Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth," 137.
- 54 McDowell, *Mind and World*, 147. See also Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth," 141.
- 55 McDowell, *Mind and World*, 147.
- 56 *Ibid.*
- 57 *Ibid.*, 154.
- 58 *Ibid.*, 150.
- 59 *Ibid.*
- 60 *Ibid.*
- 61 Rorty, "McDowell, Davidson and Spontaneity," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 58, 2 (1998): 389.
- 62 *Ibid.*, 392.
- 63 *Ibid.*, 394.
- 64 McDowell, *Mind and World*, 9.
- 65 Sellars, *Science and Metaphysics*, 7.
 - 1 The title is taken from Michael Marmura's translation in "Avicenna on Meno's Paradox: On 'Apprehending' Unknown Things Through Known Things," *Mediaeval Studies* 71 (2009): 47. Marmura translates *iṣābah* contextually as apprehending, when it literally means "hitting the mark when shooting," *ibid.*, 47, n. 2.
 - 2 Avicenna, *Al-Shifā': Al-Burhān (The Healing: Demonstration)*, ed. A. Afifi and I. Madkour (Cairo: Organisation generale egyptienne, 1956), 74. Translation in Marmura, "Avicenna on Meno's Paradox," 55.
 - 3 Black, "Al-Fārābī on Meno's Paradox," in *In the Age of Al-Fārābī: Arabic Philosophy in the Fourth/Tenth Century*, ed. Peter Adamson (London: Warburg Institute, 2008), 21, n. 23. See also Rosenthal's "On the Knowledge of Plato's Philosophy in the Islamic World," *Islamic Culture* 14 (1940): especially p. 393. For a more recent discussion of Platonic dialogues available in Arabic, see D'Ancona's "Greek Sources in Arabic and Islamic Philosophy," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Winter 2017 edition. URL: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/arabic-islamic-greek/>
 - 4 Plato, "Meno," in *Five Dialogues*, trans. G. M. A. Grube (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 80a–c.
 - 5 *Ibid.*, 80d–e.
 - 6 Scott, *Plato's Meno* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 83–84.
 - 7 Plato, "Meno," 81c–d.
 - 8 *Ibid.*, 81b. For Meno's attentiveness regarding the sayings of inspired teachers, see also 71c–d, 73c, 76b–c, 77b, 95d. Socrates's argument about there being no teachers of virtue (89e to the end of the dialogue) addresses this concern about what Meno believes.
 - 9 *Ibid.*, 80d.
- 10 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Robert Brandom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 76.
- 11 Scott, *Plato's Meno*, 84.
- 12 Scott, "Platonic Recollection," in *Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology*, ed. Gail Fine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 97.

- 13 Fine, *The Possibility of Inquiry: Meno's Paradox from Socrates to Sextus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 170.
- 14 Ibid., 171.
- 15 Plato, "Meno," 82b–85c.
- 16 Fine, *The Possibility of Inquiry*, 171.
- 17 Ferejohn, "Knowledge, Recollection, and the Forms in Republic VII," in *Blackwell Guides to Plato's Republic*, ed. G. Santos (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 225.
- 18 Ibid.
- 19 Ibid., 220.
- 20 Ibid., 225.
- 21 Ibid., 226.
- 22 Ibid., 227.
- 23 Ibid., 226.
- 24 Plato, "Phaedo," in *Five Dialogues*, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), 74e9–75a8.
- 25 Plato, *Theaetetus*, trans. John McDowell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 184b–86e. See also Plato's relegation of sensory experience to a non-epistemic role in the divided line of the *Republic*, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1992), 509d–11e.
- 26 See n. 3 above.
- 27 Aristotle, "Posterior Analytics," in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. and trans. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 71a1–2, see also 99b28–30.
- 28 Scott, *Plato's Meno*, 84.
- 29 Fine, *The Possibility of Inquiry*, 189.
- 30 Aristotle, "Posterior Analytics," 71a1–2.
- 31 Ibid., 71a12–15.
- 32 Ibid., 71a29–30.
- 33 Ferejohn, "Meno's Paradox and *De Re* Knowledge in Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration," *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 5, 2 (1988): 101.
- 34 Aristotle, "Posterior Analytics," 100a15–b5.
- 35 Ferejohn, "Meno's Paradox and *De Re* Knowledge in Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration," 104. See also Aristotle, "Posterior Analytics," 100a15 ff.
- 36 Aristotle, "Posterior Analytics," 99b27–28.
- 37 Ibid., 99b26–27.
- 38 Scott makes the following observation about Socrates's slave thought experiment: "At the end of the session, the boy has found the solution to the geometrical problem. Socrates insists that he only has true belief, but claims that he will end up with knowledge if the process of questioning is continued (85c9–d1). Projecting into the future, he imagines the boy to have achieved this knowledge and argues as follows (85d3–10): (a) So without anyone having taught him, but only by being asked questions, he will recover for himself the knowledge within him? (b) And recovering knowledge for oneself that is in oneself – is this not recollection? (c) So the knowledge, which he has now, he either acquired at some point or else always possessed. The ensuing argument (85d12–86a10) attempts to decide between these two possibilities. . . . Ultimately, Socrates concludes that any act of learning must be explained by the existence of conscious knowledge in a previous life," Scott, *Plato's Meno*, 84–85.
- 39 Aristotle, "Posterior Analytics," 99b32–35.
- 40 Ibid., 100a4–10.
- 41 Ibid., 100b10–15.
- 42 Ferejohn, "Meno's Paradox and *De Re* Knowledge in Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration," 105.

- 43 Biondi, "Aristotle's Analysis of Perception," *Laval théologique et philosophique* 66, 1 (2010): 15. See also Biondi's *Aristotle: Posterior Analytics II.19* (Québec City, Canada: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2004), 232–33. Biondi draws on Apostle's and Kosman's works to affirm the involvement of *nous* in perception. This passage from Kosman is illuminating: "In one sense, *nous* is the human capacity to think; in another it is the *archai* of that developed cognitive perceptual capacity we have to recognize things for what they are and to construct logically connected bodies of rational discourse that explain and make intelligible the world about us, the *archai*, in other words, of *epistēmē*," "What Does the Maker Mind Make?" in *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amelie Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 356. Part of my contribution is to give an account of the *this-such* structure of the *archai*.
- 44 Fine, *The Possibility of Inquiry*, 218.
- 45 Aristotle, "Posterior Analytics," 99b35–100a10.
- 46 A surprising ally in this reading of Aristotle is Martin Heidegger, who distinguishes mind's involvement in judgment (*logos*) from its involvement in sensory perception (*aisthēsis*). In *Being and Time*, he writes: "Aristotle never defends the thesis that the primordial 'locus' of truth is in the judgment. He says rather that the *logos* is that way of Being in which Dasein can either uncover or cover up. This *double possibility* is what is distinctive in the Being-true of the *logos*: the *logos* is that way of comporting oneself which can *also cover things up*. And because Aristotle never upheld the thesis we have mentioned, he was also never in a situation to 'broaden' the conception of truth in the *logos* to include pure *noein*. The truth of *aisthēsis* and of the seeing of 'ideas' is the primordial kind of uncovering. And only because *noēsis* primarily uncovers, can the *logos* as *dianoēsis* also have uncovering as its function," "Sein und Zeit," in *Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe 2* (Frankfurt-am-Mein: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 226; trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson as *Being and Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 268–69. I shall return to this passage and the ambiguity of "truth" in my discussion of Avicenna's relevant views in Chapter 5, n. 59.
- 47 Avicenna, *al-Shifā': Al-Burhān*, 75; trans. in Marmura, "Avicenna on Meno's Paradox," 58. I have modified Marmura's translation slightly to remain more faithful to the Arabic text.
- 48 Avicenna, *al-Shifā': Al-Burhān*, 73; trans. in Marmura, "Avicenna on Meno's Paradox," 52. I have modified the translation slightly.
- 49 Avicenna goes on to use the example of the runaway slave. That example substitutes knowledge by testimony for sense perception. Both are non-inferential. For a history, see Black, "Al-Fārābī on Meno's Paradox," 21, n. 23.
- 50 Avicenna, *al-Shifā': Al-Burhān*, 75; trans. in Marmura, "Avicenna on Meno's Paradox," 58. I have modified Marmura's translation slightly.
- 51 Avicenna, *al-Shifā': Al-Burhān*, 73; trans. in Marmura, "Avicenna on Meno's Paradox," 52.
- 52 Avicenna, *Avicenna's De Anima*, ed. Fazlur Rahman (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 49. Translated in *Classical Arabic Philosophy: An Anthology of Sources*, ed. and trans. Jon McGinnis and David Reisman (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2007), 184.
- 53 Avicenna, *Avicenna's De Anima*, 49; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 184.
- 54 Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of the Healing (Kitāb al-shifā': Al-Ilāhīyāt)*, trans. Michael Marmura (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), 22–23.
- 55 Michael Marmura, "Avicenna on Primary Concepts in the Metaphysics of *al-Shifā'*," in *Probings in Islamic Philosophy* (Binghamton, NY: Global Academic Publishing, 2005), 149ff.
- 56 *Ibid.*, 151.
- 57 Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of the Healing*, 22.
- 58 Avicenna, *Avicenna's De Anima*, 235; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 199. I have modified the translation slightly.

- 59 Avicenna, “Fī ithbāt al-nubuwwāt,” in *Philosophical Texts and Studies*, ed. Michael Marmura, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dār Al-Nahār, 1968), 44. Translated by Marmura as “On the Proof of Prophecies,” in *Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook*, ed. Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961), 114. Dimitri Gutas questions the authenticity of this text in the second edition of his *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition* (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 485–89. See also his “The Empiricism of Avicenna,” *Oriens* 40 (2012): 413, n. 53.
- 60 Avicenna, *Avicenna’s De Anima*, 44–45; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 182.
- 61 Avicenna, *Avicenna’s De Anima*, 44; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 182.
- 62 For a discussion of this issue, see Black’s “Estimation (*Wahm*) in Avicenna,” *Dialogue* 32 (1993): 245, n. 2.
- 63 In “The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophical Texts,” *Harvard Theological Review* 28 (1935), Wolfson enumerates the following four: (1) *al-mutakhayyila*, (2) *al-wahm*, (3) *al-dhākira* and (4) *al-mufakira* (94, n. 26).
- 64 For a discussion of the distinction between compositive and retentive imagination, see Black’s “Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations,” *Topoi* 19 (2000): 60.
- 65 Avicenna, *Avicenna’s De Anima*, 60.
- 66 Ibid., 43; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 181. I have modified Marmura’s translation slightly.
- 67 Black, “Estimation (*Wahm*) in Avicenna,” 220.
- 68 Avicenna, *Al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt: Al-Taṣawwuf*, ed. S. Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-ma‘ārif, 1968), 9. Translated in *Ibn Sīnā and Mysticism: Remarks and Admonitions Part Four*, trans. Shams Inati (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1996), 70.
- 69 Black, “Estimation (*Wahm*) in Avicenna,” 226.
- 70 Kaukua, *Avicenna on Subjectivity: A Philosophical Study* (Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2007), 55.
- 71 Avicenna, *Avicenna’s De Anima*, 206; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 186. The translation is modified slightly to remain more faithful to the Arabic text.
- 72 Black, “Mental Existence in Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna,” *Mediaeval Studies* 56 (1999): 16.
- 73 Avicenna, *Avicenna’s De Anima*, 206; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 186.
- 74 For this discussion, I draw on McDowell’s interpretation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (especially books 1–2) in *Mind and World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 80–86.
- 75 Wolfson, “The Terms *Taṣawwur* and *Taṣdīq* in Arabic Philosophy and Their Greek, Latin and Hebrew Equivalents,” *The Moslem World* 33 (1943): 115.
- 76 Ibid., 124.
- 77 Ibid., 121.
- 78 Ibid., 123.
- 79 Lameer, *Conception and Belief in Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī* (Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy, 2006), 15. It is also worth noting that Black believes Alfarabi is the author of the distinction, “Al-Fārābī on Meno’s Paradox,” 25, n. 32. Lameer, however, is in agreement with Wolfson (“The Terms *Taṣawwur* and *Taṣdīq* in Arabic Philosophy and Their Greek, Latin and Hebrew Equivalents,” 123) in insisting that there was an earlier author who first introduced the concise terminology for the formal distinction, *Conception and Belief in Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī*, 24. Wolfson thinks this mysterious author was Greek, whereas, for Lameer, “whoever did introduce these terms must have had a more than cursory understanding of the philosophy of Aristotle and of the Arabic tradition developing around his works,” *ibid.*
- 80 Ibid., 15.
- 81 Ibid., 17. Lameer’s reference is to Miriam Galston’s unpublished 1973 PhD thesis, “Opinion and Knowledge in Farabi’s Understanding of Aristotle’s Philosophy.”

- 82 See the section titled “Avicenna on sense perception, the internal senses and abstraction” in this chapter.
- 83 Ibid., 18. This is a restatement of Lameer’s thesis on Alfarabi’s *taṣawwur* and *taṣdīq* in the earlier *Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogistics: Greek Theory and Islamic Practice* (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 266–68.
- 84 Black, “Al-Fārābī on Meno’s Paradox,” 23.
- 85 Lameer, *Conception and Belief in Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī*, 24.
- 86 Ibid., 52, 58.
- 87 According to Lameer, Shīrāzī and his source Ibn Kammūna ascribed the “pre-condition” account to Alfarabi and Avicenna. The “constituent” reading, he argues, belongs to the later philosophers, like Ṭūsī, *ibid.*, 64–67.
- 88 Ibid., 64.
- 89 Black, “Al-Fārābī on Meno’s Paradox,” 18.
- 90 Ibid.
- 91 Aristotle, “Posterior Analytics,” II, 19, 99b25–30.
- 92 Black, “Al-Fārābī on Meno’s Paradox,” 18.
- 93 Ibid., 19.
- 94 Ibid., 22.
- 95 Ibid., 33.
- 96 Lameer’s source is Alfarabi’s *Kitāb al-burhān*, 84.10–11, 45.2–3. He also draws on *Kitāb mabādī ārā’ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila*, 94.6–10 (ed. Walzer); *Fuṣūl muntaza’a*, 52.13–54.1 = *Fuṣūl al-madanī*, 127.10–12. See *Conception and Belief in Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī*, 31.
- 97 Ibid., 32.
- 98 Lameer contends that Alfarabi’s “vague” conception is a staple of the subsequent Persian philosophical tradition, *ibid.*, 92.
- 99 Lameer, *Conception and Belief in Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī*, 8.
- 100 Wolfson, “The Terms *Taṣawwur* and *Taṣdīq* in Arabic Philosophy and Their Greek, Latin and Hebrew Equivalents,” 121.
- 101 McDowell, *Having the World in View* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 258–59.
- 102 Ibid., 262.
- 103 Ibid., 262–64.
- 104 Ibid., 265.
- 105 Avicenna, *Al-Shifā’*: *Al-Burhān*, 222; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 154. I have modified the translation slightly.
- 106 Avicenna, *Al-Shifā’*: *Al-Burhān*, 95. Translated in Jules Janssens, “‘Experience’ (*tajriba*) in Classical Arabic Philosophy (Al-Fārābī – Avicenna),” *Questio* 4 (2004): 55.
- 107 See McGinnis’s “Scientific Methodologies in Medieval Islam,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 41, 3 (2003): 309. McGinnis is correct that we should not confuse Avicenna’s account of induction with those of modern philosophers, especially since, as I have argued above, for Avicenna (and for Aristotle), sensory experience already involves the operation of the intellect.
- 108 McGinnis’s “Scientific Methodologies in Medieval Islam,” 321. This is Janssens’s characterization of the syllogism:

Scammony is a force of purgation related to a bilious humour.

Each force of purgation related to a bilious humour (if actual) evacuates bile.

Scammony (if actual) evacuates bile [“‘Experience’ (*tajriba*) in Classical Arabic Philosophy (Al-Fārābī – Avicenna),” 56].

- 109 Avicenna, *Avicenna's De Anima*, 161; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 155. See also McGinnis on Avicenna's critique of Aristotelian induction, "Scientific Methodologies in Medieval Islam," 315.
- 110 Janssens, "'Experience' (*tajriba*) in Classical Arabic Philosophy (Al-Fārābī – Avicenna)," 58.
- 111 Avicenna, *Avicenna's De Anima*, 49; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 184. In *The Metaphysics of the Healing*, 22–23, Avicenna draws a parallel between primary intelligibles and primary concepts. That primary intelligibles are also imparted immediately by the Active Intellect is confirmed in Avicenna's *The Provenance and Destination*, where he states that "the first thing originated in the material intellect (*al-'aql al-hayūlānī*) by the active intellect (*al-'aql al-fa'āl*) is the dispositional intellect (*al-'aql bi-l-malaka*). And that is the forms of the first intelligibles some of which occur [in the intellect] by no experience, no syllogism, and no induction at all, like 'the whole is greater than the part,' and some of which occur [in the intellect] by experience, like 'every [chunk of] earth is heavy.'" *Al-Mabda' wa-l-ma'ād*, ed. Abdullāh Nūrānī (Tehran: The Institute of Islamic Studies, 1984), 99. Translated by Mousavian and Ardeshtir, "Avicenna on the Primary Propositions," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 39, 3 (2018): 221. I have adjusted the Arabic transliterations.
- 112 Adamson, "On Knowledge of Particulars," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 105 (2005): 267.
- 113 Ibid., 267. This view is also defended in Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 376.
- 114 In sense perception, the intellect's transcendental unity is drawn upon; hence the significance of Adamson's own observation that sensation grasps *existence*. I elucidate Avicenna's account in Chapter 5.
- 115 Avicenna, *Al-Shifā': Al-Burhān*, 73; trans. in Marmura, "Avicenna on Meno's Paradox," 52.
- 116 Avicenna, *Al-Shifā': Al-Burhān*, 249; trans. in Adamson, "On Knowledge of Particulars," 267.
- 117 Avicenna, *Al-Shifā': Al-Burhān*, 73; trans. in Marmura, "Avicenna on Meno's Paradox," 52.
- 118 Gutas, "The Empiricism of Avicenna," 392, 423–24.
- 119 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, 62.
- 120 Gutas, "The Empiricism of Avicenna," 413.
- 121 Aristotle, "Posterior Analytics," II, 19, 99b33–34. See also *Metaphysics*, 1087a33–b3 and *De Anima* 2.5.
- 122 Adamson, "Knowledge of Particulars," 273. Adamson considers this "the greatest weakness in Avicenna's theory of knowledge," *ibid.*, 271. Of course, he is not privy to the demythologized account of empirical knowledge, which I have advanced in this work.
- 123 Marmura, "Avicenna on Primary Concepts in the Metaphysics of *al-Shifā'*," 151.
- 124 Avicenna, *Avicenna's De Anima*, 235; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 199. I have modified the translation slightly.
- 125 Avicenna, "Fī ithbāt al-nubuwwāt," 44; trans. in *Medieval Political Philosophy*, 114.
- 126 Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, 485–89. See also his "The Empiricism of Avicenna," 413, n. 53.
- 127 Ibid.
- 128 The target is Herbert Davidson. See the section "Between emanatism and mythological empiricism" in the introductory chapter.
- 129 Hasse, "Avicenna on Abstraction," in *Aspects of Avicenna*, ed. Robert Wisnovsky (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2001), 57.
- 130 Ibid.
- 131 Ibid., 56.
- 132 For the earlier position in the *Compendium*, see *ibid.*, 52. For the later view in the *Ishārāt*, see *ibid.*, 63.

- 133 Avicenna, *Avicenna's De Anima*, 235; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 200. I have modified the translation slightly.
- 134 Hasse, "Avicenna on Abstraction," 63.
- 135 See also Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West* (Turin: The Warburg Institute, 2000), 186.
- 136 Gutas, "The Empiricism of Avicenna," 411. See also Hasse, "Avicenna's Epistemological Optimism," in *Interpreting Avicenna*, ed. Peter Adamson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 119. In "Avicenna's Epistemological Optimism," Hasse writes: "In sum, the form (or more precisely, the material form, since the immaterial form is grasped directly without abstraction) has to be grasped by way of abstraction, but it nevertheless comes from the active intellect, as soon as the abstraction process is completed and the perfect disposition for receiving the form is reached. This is possible since the essences of material forms exist both as universals in the active intellect and as particulars in the sublunar world. But abstraction is only needed for the first acquisition of a form. After that, the rational soul can make the form be present in the mind whenever it wishes: 'The first learning is like the cure of an eye', as Avicenna puts it," in *Interpreting Avicenna*, ed. Peter Adamson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 117.
- 1 Brentano, "Nous Poietikos: A Survey of Earlier Interpretations," in *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amelie Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 316.
- 2 Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, ed. and trans. L. McAlister (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1995), 88.
- 3 Black, "Intentionality in Medieval Arabic Philosophy," *Quaestio* 10 (2010): 65–67. Black writes that the main source of the claim that "intention" is a mistranslation of *ma'nā* is Kwame Gyekye who maintained that "[e]tymologically, 'conceptus', rather than 'intentio,' would be a better translation for *ma'nā*, which means meaning or concept; but it was 'intentio' that was used," in Kwame Gyekye, "The Terms 'Prima Intentio' and 'Secunda Intentio' in Arabic Logic," *Speculum* 46, 1 (1971): 36. This article is valuable for showing how the translation of *ma'na* as *intentio* sometimes led to confusion in texts where *intentio* was in fact a translation of the Arabic term *qasd* – "intention" in the sense of "purpose." More recently, in his translation of *al-'Ibārah*, Allan Bäck makes a similar observation: "The AVICENNA LATINUS tends to conflate 'senses' and 'intentions'. For Avicenna the first are mental states in the soul, quiddities in the mind abstracted via sense perceptions from quiddities *in re*; the latter are those senses taken not as those mental items but as pointing to things not in the mind," in *Al-'Ibārah: Avicenna's Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione Part One and Part Two* (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 2013), 27, n. 50. Black, however, claims that "strictly speaking this is true inasmuch as *ma'nā* literally means 'meaning' or 'thought' – as expressed in phrases such as 'by x I mean y'. But as an interpretation of the fundamental idea behind the generic and technical use of *ma'nā* in Arabic, *intentio* is an entirely legitimate Latin rendition of the term," Black, "Intentionality in Medieval Arabic Philosophy," 68. I am in qualified agreement with Black's assessment of the legitimacy of *intentio* as the rendition of *ma'nā*, because in my interpretation of Avicenna, the intellect is involved even *in re* and in pointing to things not in the mind. My agreement is qualified because Black espouses an emanatist view that deprives sensory perception of intellectual content. See my criticism of Black and emanatism in "Avicenna on sense perception, the internal senses and abstraction" of Chapter 4 and also later in this section. In this passage, I use "meaning" for Bäck's "sense," but where there is a use of another word for *ma'nā*, I shall insert the Arabic term in parenthesis in order to avoid confusion.
- 4 Ibid., 68. The passage is from Avicenna, *Al-Shifā': Al-'Ibārah (Interpretation)*, ed. M. El-Khodeiri and I. Madkour (Cairo: Dār al-kātib al-'Arabī, 1970), 2–3. I have adjusted the translation, drawing on Bäck's more careful translation in *Al-'Ibārah: Avicenna's Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione Part One and Part Two*, 27. Bäck also provides a more comprehensive account of meaning in this work and indicates that Avicenna mentions a non-empirical source of meanings.

- Bäck writes: “That is, either these attributes are in the perceptions but not obviously, or they do not come from the perceptions at all but are composed by the intellect upon them. Given that universals are supposed to be abstracted from singular perceptions for Aristotle, it seems that only the first option should hold, that these should be present in the perceptions but hidden and inchoately. However, Avicenna has the doctrine that an activated intellect can have as well a pure intuition of quiddities in themselves. . . . Hence the second option,” *ibid.*, 25–26, n. 45. I discuss Avicenna’s account of the “activated intellect’s pure intuition” in “Avicenna on the human soul” in Chapter 5 and in the concluding chapter. In the same section of Chapter 5, I also offer my account of the relation between Aristotle and Avicenna on the “activated intellect” (i.e., the acquired intellect). Of course, I maintain that the intellect is involved in the production of perceptual meaning as well.
- 5 Indeed, this alliance concerns a synthesis of Arabic grammarian views of meaning and those held by Baghdadī Peripatetics. See Adamson and Key, “Philosophy of Language in the Medieval Arabic Tradition,” in *Linguistic Content: New Essays on the History of Philosophy of Language*, ed. Margaret Cameron and Robert J. Stainton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 74–99. This essay draws from Mahdī’s earlier “Language and Logic in Classical Islam,” in *Logic in Classical Islamic Culture*, ed. G. E. von Grunbaum (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1970), 51–83.
 - 6 Alfarabi, *Kitāb al-ḥurūf*, ed. Muḥsin Maḥdī (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1970), 131–62. The contrasting forms of philosophy are dialectical and sophistical.
 - 7 Avicenna, *Al-Shifā’: Al-‘Ibārah (Interpretation)*, 5.
 - 8 Sellars, “Being and Being Known,” in *Science, Perception, and Reality* (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1963), 45–46.
 - 9 *Ibid.*, 56.
 - 10 Rahman, *Prophecy in Islam: Philosophy and Orthodoxy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958), 15. See also Herbert Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 93–94. Tommaso Alpina maintains that Davidson inherits this view from Gilson (“Intellectual Knowledge, Active Intellect and Intellectual Memory in Avicenna’s *Kitāb al-Nafs* and Its Aristotelian Background,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 25 (2014): 136–37). I agree, but in *Reason Unbound* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2011), §4.2, I contend that such a reading has been in circulation at least since the writings of Thomas Aquinas. Other more contemporary scholars embracing the emanatist reading of Avicenna include Black, “Avicenna on the Ontological and Epistemic Status of Fictional Beings,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 8 (1997): 445; see also Taylor, “Al-Fārābī and Avicenna: Two Recent Contributions,” *MESA Bulletin* 39 (2005): 182.
 - 11 For an expression of her emanatism, see Black’s “Avicenna on the Ontological and Epistemic Status of Fictional Beings,” 445.
 - 12 Black, “Intentionality in Medieval Arabic Philosophy,” 76.
 - 13 López-Farjeat, “Avicenna on Non-Conceptual Content and Self-Awareness in Non-Human Animals,” in *Subjectivity and Selfhood in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. J. Kaukua and T. Ekenberg (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2016), 66.
 - 14 *Ibid.*
 - 15 *Ibid.* The reference is to Kaukua, “Avicenna on the Soul’s Activity in Perception,” in *Active Perception in the History of Philosophy: From Plato to Modern Philosophy*, ed. J. F. Silva and M. Yrjönsuuri (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer, 2014), 109–10.
 - 16 Kaukua, “The Problem of Intentionality in Avicenna,” *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 25 (2014): 217–18.
 - 17 *Ibid.*, 219.
 - 18 McDowell, “Avoiding the Myth of the Given,” in *Having the World in View* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 258–59.

- 19 Ibid., 260, 262–63.
- 20 Ibid., 262.
- 21 McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 10.
- 22 Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Robert Brandom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 40. Of course, in this work, Sellars thinks of this application as propositional in structure. Later, as we have seen, he revises this problematic view and characterizes it as having a *this-such* structure. See McDowell’s “A Sellarsian Blind Spot,” in *Sellars and His Legacy*, ed. James R. O’Shea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 101.
- 23 For a deeper engagement of this issue, see the section “Sellars on picturing and sense impression discourse” in Chapter 2.
- 24 McDowell, “Avoiding the Myth of the Given,” 265; See also “Conceptual Capacities in Perception,” in *Having the World in View* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 127; “Apperceptive I and the Empirical Self,” in *Having the World in View* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 148–49.
- 25 McDowell, “Avoiding the Myth of the Given,” 258, 262–63.
- 26 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965), B139.
- 27 McDowell, “Apperceptive I and the Empirical Self,” 148.
- 28 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B110–11.
- 29 Ibid., A81–B107.
- 30 Ibid., A106–10, B131–36.
- 31 McDowell, *Mind and World*, 99.
- 32 Ibid., 99.
- 33 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Bxxiii–xxiv.
- 34 McDowell, *Mind and World*, 95–96.
- 35 Ibid., 96.
- 36 McDowell, “Hegel and the Myth of the Given,” in *Das Interesse des Denkens Hegel aus heutiger Sicht*, ed. Wolfgang Welsch and Klaus Vieweg (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2007), 77–78.
- 37 Ibid., 82ff.
- 38 Aristotle, “Metaphysics,” in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, trans. W.D. Ross and ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1003a33–b19.
- 39 Ibid., 1003a33–35.
- 40 Cohen, “Aristotle’s Metaphysics,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Winter 2016 edition. URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/>
- 41 Aristotle, “Metaphysics,” 1003a35–b18.
- 42 Thomasson, “Categories,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Winter 2016 edition. URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/categories/>
- 43 For a brief history of the discussion up to Avicenna’s writing, see Treiger’s “Avicenna’s Notion of Transcendental Modulation of Existence (*Taškīk al-Wuğūd*, *Analogue Entis*) and Its Greek and Arabic Sources,” in *Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture and Religion*, ed. F. Opwis and D. Reisman (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 327–63. For a discussion of the later period of Islamic philosophy, see Menn, “Fārābī in the Reception of Avicenna’s Metaphysics: Averroes Against Avicenna on Being and Unity,” in *The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception of Avicenna’s Metaphysics*, ed. D.N. Hasse and A. Bertolacci (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2012), 51–96; see also Rizvi, *Mulla Sadra and Metaphysics: The Modulation of Being* (London: Routledge, 2009). For a discussion of these topics in the contemporary Anglo-American tradition, see Owen, “Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle,” in *Aristotle and Plato in Mid-Fourth Century*, ed. I. Düring and G.E.L. Owen (Göteborg, Sweden: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1960); and Cohen, “Aristotle’s Metaphysics.”

- 44 Aristotle, "De Anima," in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes and trans. W. D. Ross (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 418a6–9.
- 45 Ibid., 418a9–10.
- 46 Ibid., 418a17–18. For unity, see *De Anima* 3.1, 425a15–16.
- 47 Ibid., 418a18–19.
- 48 Ibid., 418a20–23.
- 49 Biondi, "Aristotle's Analysis of Perception," *Laval théologique et philosophique* 66, 1 (2010): 21.
- 50 Ibid., 29.
- 51 Ibid., 28.
- 52 Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of the Healing* (*Kitāb al-shifā': Al-Ilāhiyyāt*), trans. Michael Marmura (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), 27.
- 53 Menn argues that Avicenna's view is developed from al-Kindi's views on existence (*wujūd*), "Fārābī in the Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics," 69–70.
- 54 Ibid., 71.
- 55 Menn, "Al-Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Hurūf* and His Analyses of the Senses of Being," *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 18 (2008): 76–84, see especially 77–78.
- 56 Ibid., 81–82.
- 57 Menn, "Fārābī in the Reception of Avicenna's Metaphysics," 70–71.
- 58 Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of the Healing*, 24.
- 59 This view of truth is related to Aristotle's account of truth as uncovering (*alētheia*). In *Being and Time*, Heidegger distinguishes this sense of truth from the truth and falsity of the contents of judgments and relates the former to sense perception (*aisthēsis*). He writes: "Aristotle never defends the thesis that the primordial 'locus' of truth is in the judgment. He says rather that the *logos* is that way of Being in which Dasein can either uncover or cover up. This *double possibility* is what is distinctive in the Being-true of the *logos*: the *logos* is that way of comporting oneself which can *also cover things up*. And because Aristotle never upheld the thesis we have mentioned, he was also never in a situation to 'broaden' the conception of truth in the *logos* to include pure *noein*. The truth of *aisthēsis* and of the seeing of 'ideas' is the primordial kind of uncovering. And only because *noēsis* primarily uncovers, can the *logos* as *dianoēin* also have uncovering as its function," in "Sein und Zeit," in *Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 2 (Frankfurt-am-Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 226; translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson as *Being and Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 268–269. Earlier in *Being and Time*, Heidegger had already explicitly distinguished the logocentric truth and falsity from the more primordial truth (of *aisthēsis*) as uncovering: "[B]ecause the *logos* is a letting-something-be-seen, it can *therefore* be true or false. But here everything depends on our steering clear of any conception of truth which is construed in the sense of 'agreement'. This idea is by no means the primary one in the concept of *alētheia*. The 'Being-true' of the *logos* as *alētheuein* means that in *legein* as *apophanesthai* the entities of which one is talking must be taken out of their hiddenness; one must let them be seen as something unhidden (*alētheis*). . . . Similarly, 'Being false' (*pseudesthai*) amount to deceiving in the sense of *covering up* . . . putting something in front of something (in such a way as to let it be seen) and thereby passing it off as something which it is not," BT57=SZ33.
- 60 Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of the Healing*, 153. Already, on page 24, Avicenna stated the complication: "This is because if you said, 'the reality of such a thing exists either in the concrete, in the soul, or absolutely, being common to both,' this would have a meaning, realized and understood."
- 61 Marmura, "Avicenna's Chapter on Universals in the *Isagoge* of His *Shifā'*," in *Probing in Islamic Philosophy* (Binghamton, NY: Global Academic Publishing, 2005), 38.
- 62 Aristotle, "De Anima," 427–29.

- 63 Rahman, "Essence and Existence in Avicenna," *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 4 (1958): 10.
- 64 See Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of the Healing*, 156.
- 65 Black, "Mental Existence in Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna," *Mediaeval Studies* 61 (1999): 64.
- 66 Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of the Healing*, 274. See Marmura's extensive note on the relation between *annīya* and existence, *ibid.*, 383, n. 1.
- 67 *Ibid.*, 32.
- 68 *Ibid.*, 330. See also Seyyed Hossein Nasr's *An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1993), 199.
- 69 Treiger, "Avicenna's Notion of Transcendental Modulation of Existence (*Taškīk al-Wuğūd, Analogia Entis*) and Its Greek and Arabic Sources," 327–28.
- 70 *Ibid.*, 353–63.
- 71 *Ibid.*, 357.
- 72 *Ibid.*, 357. Avicenna's transcendental modulation gets appropriated by Suarez's notion of *metaphysica specialis*. In Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, the hierarchy of being is broached (and modified given his narrow construal of knowledge) in his discussion of the cosmopolitan concept of philosophy where categorial unity is subordinated to the highest good, which is the idea of God (A839–40=B867–68).
- 73 For an excellent discussion of Avicenna's cosmology, see Nasr's *An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines*, 177–274.
- 74 Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West* (Turin: The Warburg Institute, 2000), 188.
- 75 Janssens, "The Notions of *Wāhib al-ṣuwar* (Giver of Forms) and *Wāhib al-'aql* (Bestower of Intelligence) in Ibn Sīnā," in *Intellect et imagination dans la Philosophie Médiévale*, ed. M. C. Pacheco and J. F. Meirinhos (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 558.
- 76 Alpina, "Intellectual Knowledge, Active Intellect and Intellectual Memory in Avicenna's *Kitāb al-Nafs* and Its Aristotelian Background," 170.
- 77 Hasse, *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West*, 186–89.
- 78 Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of the Healing*, 22.
- 79 Marmura, "Avicenna on Primary Concepts in the Metaphysics of *al-Shifā'*," in *Probing in Islamic Philosophy* (Binghamton, NY: Global Academic Publishing, 2005), 151.
- 80 Avicenna, *Avicenna's De Anima*, ed. Fazlur Rahman (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 235. Translated in *Classical Arabic Philosophy: An Anthology of Sources*, ed. and trans. Jon McGinnis and David Reisman (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2007), 200.
- 81 Bertolacci, "'Necessary' as Primary Concept in Avicenna's Metaphysics," in *Conoscenza e continuità*, ed. S. Perfetti (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2008), 39.
- 82 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A106–10, B131–36.
- 83 *Ibid.*, A81=B106–7.
- 84 *Ibid.*, A107.
- 85 *Ibid.*, B160–61.
- 86 This is what I take Avicenna to mean in the end of the end of the passage quoted earlier: "[F]rom the light of the Active Intellect they come to be within [the rational soul] the abstract version of those forms [free] from [material] taints" (Avicenna, *Avicenna's De Anima*, 235; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 200).
- 87 Avicenna, *Avicenna's De Anima*, 240; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 203. This is based on Aristotle's *De Anima*, 3.4 429a27–28.
- 88 Avicenna, *Avicenna's De Anima*, 239. Translated in Adamson's "Porphyrius Arabus on Nature and Art. Appendix 1: Avicenna, Yahyā ibn 'Adī, and Porphyry's Theory of Intellect," in *Studies in Porphyry*, ed. G. Karamanulis and A. Sheppard (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2007), 156.

- 89 Ibid., 159–60. See also Finnegan, “Avicenna’s Refutation of Porphyrius,” in *Avicenna Commemoration Volume*, ed. V. Courtois (Calcutta: Iran Society, 1956), 196. For a contemporary reading of Aristotle as holding such a view, see Black, “Mental Existence in Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna,” 58–59.
- 90 Aristotle, “De Anima,” 431b21; see also 3.5, 430a15.
- 91 Adamson, “*Porphyrius Arabus* on Nature and Art. Appendix 1: Avicenna, Yaḥyā ibn ‘Adī, and Porphyry’s Theory of Intellect,” 157. See Aristotle’s *De Anima*, 3.4, 430a3–5; 3.7, 431b17; 3.8, 431b21–432a1.
- 92 Ibid., 430a14–17.
- 93 Ibid., 430a25.
- 94 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1048b18–30.
- 95 Ibid.
- 96 Ibid., 1048b23–25.
- 97 Aristotle, “De Anima,” 430a17–19.
- 98 Ibid., 430a15–16.
- 99 Nasr, *An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines*, 199.
- 100 The transcendence thesis has its roots in Aristotle’s *De Anima*, 3.5, in which he explicitly asserts the separate existence of the Active Intellect. For Aristotle, the Active Intellect is always in a state of full actualization, i.e., it is thought thinking itself. The human intellect, on the other hand, *may* achieve that actualization, presumably by coming to contain the intelligibles through philosophical development. Aristotle states that “potential knowledge is temporally prior in an individual <knower>, but in general it is not even temporally prior. But <productive intellect [Active Intellect]> does not understand at one time and not at another,” Aristotle, “On the Soul,” in *Aristotle: Selections*, ed. and trans. Gail Fine and T. H. Irwin (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1995), 430a20–23. In other words, in the individual knower, the state of actualization comes after potentiality, but overall, it is the Active Intellect that is prior for “without this <productive intellect> nothing understands,” *ibid.*, 430a25–26.
- 101 Avicenna, “Fī ithbāt al-nubuwwāt,” in *Philosophical Texts and Studies*, ed. Michael Marmura, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dār al-Nahār, 1968), 46. Translation in “On the Proof of Prophecies,” in *Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook*, ed. Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961), 114. See also Avicenna, *Avicenna’s De Anima*, 50; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 185.
- 102 The discussion of the soul in this section is based on my engagement with this topic in *Reason Unbound* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2011), §6.1. Of course, the material has been modified extensively in form and content.
- 103 Avicenna, *Avicenna’s De Anima*, 12. Translated in “On the Soul” by Goodman, *Philosophical Forum* 1 (1969): 559.
- 104 Avicenna, *Avicenna’s De Anima*, 8; trans. in “On the Soul,” 557.
- 105 Avicenna, *Avicenna’s De Anima*, 11; trans. in “On the Soul,” 559.
- 106 Ibid.
- 107 Ibid.
- 108 Aristotle, “De Anima,” 414a26.
- 109 Ibid., 413a4–6.
- 110 Avicenna, *Avicenna’s De Anima*, 40; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 180.
- 111 Avicenna, *Avicenna’s De Anima*, 41; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 180.
- 112 Avicenna, *Avicenna’s De Anima*, 40; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 179.
- 113 Avicenna, *Avicenna’s De Anima*, 207; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 186.

- 114 Avicenna, *Avicenna's De Anima*, 16; trans. in "On the Soul," 561–62. In "Avicenna's 'Flying Man' in Context," Marmura identifies three different occurrences of the Flying Man argument in Avicenna's work: two in the *De Anima* and one in *Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt* (*Monist* 69 [July 1986]: 383–95). The version I am discussing is the lengthiest one.
- 115 Frede, "On Aristotle's Conception of the Soul," in *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amelie Okseberg Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 94. See also Heinaman, "Aristotle and the Mind-Body Problem," *Phronesis* 35 (1990): 92–99.
- 116 Aristotle, "De Anima," 415b18ff.
- 117 Ibid., 412a27–b1.
- 118 Ibid., 413a9.
- 119 Ibid.
- 120 Gerson, "The Unity of Intellect in Aristotle's 'De Anima,'" *Phronesis* 49 (2004): 356.
- 121 For a contemporary effort to resolve this tension in Aristotle's texts, see Gerson's "The Unity of Intellect in Aristotle's 'De Anima.'" For a careful discussion of intellect and intellection in Aristotle, refer to Biondi's "Nous as Human Intuition" and "The Causality of the Act of *Noēsis*," in his *Aristotle: Posterior Analytics II.19* (Québec City, Canada: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2004).
- 122 Rahman, *Avicenna's Psychology*, trans. Fazlur Rahman (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 5.
- 123 Wisnovsky, *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 126.
- 124 Ibid.
- 125 Ibid., 15–16.
- 126 Ibid., 136. By final cause *qua to hou*, Wisnovsky is drawing upon Aristotle's distinction "between the type of final cause which is 'that in view of which' (*to hou*) and the type of final cause which is 'that for the benefit of which' (*to hōi*)," *ibid.*, 133.
- 127 Ibid., 135.
- 128 Avicenna, *Avicenna's De Anima*, 16. I am using Marmura's translation in "Avicenna's 'Flying Man' in Context," 386.
- 129 Marmura, "Avicenna's 'Flying Man' in Context," 386–93. Black affirms such a reading in her "Estimation (*Wahm*) in Avicenna: The Logical and Psychological Dimensions," *Dialogue* 32 (1993): 238.
- 130 Kaukua, *Self-Awareness in Islamic Philosophy: Avicenna and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 36.
- 131 Aristotle, "De Anima," 430a10–25.
- 132 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1048b18–30.
- 133 Avicenna, *Avicenna's De Anima*, 50; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 185.
- 134 Avicenna, *Avicenna's De Anima*, 16; trans. in "On the Soul," 561. A version of this point is made by Hasse in the following: "The inference drawn is not: the Flying Man affirms his own existence, therefore the soul exists independently from the body. But: the Flying Man affirms the existence of his essence but not of his body, therefore the soul – being his essence – exists independently from his body. The clue is that the Flying Man detects a core entity which we identify as the soul," *Avicenna's De Anima in the Latin West*, 86.
- 135 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1048b18–30.
- 136 See also Alwishah's defense of this point in "Avicenna on Animal Self-Awareness, Cognition and Identity," *Arabic Science and Philosophy* 26 (2016): 90.
- 137 Avicenna, *Avicenna's De Anima*, 234–35; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 199–200. I have modified the translation slightly.
- 1 McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 71.

- 2 Ibid. Sellars, in a rush to identify nature with the realm of law, distinguishes the manifest image from the original image, where the manifest image is “the modification of an [original] image in which *all* objects are capable of *the full range* of personal activity, the modification consisting of a gradual pruning of the implications of saying with respect to what we would call an inanimate object, that it *did* something,” Sellars, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” in *Science, Perception, and Reality* (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1963), 12. The pruning discards “the implications with respect to plans, purposes, and policies” (ibid., 14). McDowell agrees that the original image should be pruned, but he disagrees with Sellars’s insistence that the scientific image will get at the real.
- 3 McDowell, *Mind and World*, 84–85.
- 4 Ibid., 118. In “Avicenna on sense perception, internal sense and abstraction” in Chapter 4, I discussed the Avicennian version of this argument in regard to the contrast between human and animal sense perception.
- 5 Azadpur, *Reason Unbound: On Spiritual Practice in Islamic Peripatetic Philosophy* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2011), 53–63.
- 6 Avicenna, *The Metaphysics of the Healing* (*Kitāb al-shifā’: Al-Ilāhīyāt*), trans. Michael Marmura (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), 378.
- 7 In *The Metaphysics of the Healing*, Book 9, Chapter 7, Avicenna distinguishes theoretically and morally perfect souls from the theoretically perfect and morally imperfect souls. In the afterlife the latter requires a period of purification, while the former conjoins immediately with the Active Intellect.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Avicenna, *Kitāb al-najāt*, ed. Mājid Fakhry (Beirut: Dār al-’ifāq al-jadīda, 1982), 205–7. Translation available in Fazlur Rahman’s *Avicenna’s Psychology* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 35–38.
- 10 Avicenna, *Avicenna’s De Anima*, ed. Fazlur Rahman (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), 50. Translated in *Classical Arabic Philosophy: An Anthology of Sources*, trans and ed. Jon McGinnis and David Reisman (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2007), 185.
- 11 Corbin’s *Histoire de la philosophie islamique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 43. Translated as *History of Islamic Philosophy*, trans. Liadain Sherrard (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1993), 18.
- 12 Avicenna, “Fī ithbāt al-nubuwwāt,” in *Philosophical Texts and Studies*, ed. Michael Marmura, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dār al-Nahār, 1968), 46. Translated in “On the Proof of Prophecies,” in *Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook*, ed. Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1961), 114. See also Avicenna, *Avicenna’s De Anima*, 50; trans. in *Classical Arabic Philosophy*, 185. As we have seen in Chapter 5, Avicenna distinguishes the Active Intellect from the Necessary Existent (creator). The Necessary Existent is central to Avicenna’s account of the hierarchy of beings, but its mention is not central to the line of reasoning pursued here.
- 13 McDowell, *Mind and World*, 126.
- 14 Ibid., 125.
- 15 Ibid., 184–85.
- 16 Alfarabi, *Kitāb al-ḥurūf*, ed. Muḥsin Maḥdī (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1970), 131–62.
- 17 See the discussion of Alfarabi’s account of the relation between logic and grammar in Adamson and Key, “Philosophy of Language in the Medieval Arabic Tradition,” in *Linguistic Content: New Essays on the History of Philosophy of Language*, ed. Margaret Cameron and Robert J. Stainton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 82–86.
- 18 For Avicenna’s relevant views, see *Al-Shifā’: Al-’Ibārah* (*Interpretation*), ed. M. El-Khodeiri and I. Madkour (Cairo: Dār al-kātib al-‘Arabī, 1970), 5. Translated by Bäck in *Al-’Ibārah: Avicenna’s*

- Commentary on Aristotle's De Interpretatione Part One and Part Two* (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 2013), 30.
- 19 McDowell, "Virtue and Reason," in *Mind, Value, and Reality* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 73. McDowell confesses that he is inspired by Murdoch's reading of Plato in "The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts," in *Sovereignty of Good* (New York: Routledge, 1970), 75–101.
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